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COMMITTED TO COORDINATION? 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCILS AS A FEDERAL SAFEGUARD 
JOHANNA SCHNABEL 
1. INTRODUCTION1 
In 2003, Canadian provinces and territories solemnly established the Council of the 
Federation (CoF). According to the founding agreement, the new council was expected to 
revitalize not only interprovincial relations but also Canadian federalism in general. Provinces 
had been disappointed by federal actions for over a decade, claiming that the federal 
government had been encroaching on areas of provincial jurisdiction. Strengthening 
horizontal coordination, they expected, would not only contain the federal government but 
also provide provinces and territories with a new leadership role within the federation so that 
federal conflicts triggered by unilateral actions of the federal government would be reduced. 
In 2006, Australian states followed the Canadian example and established the Council of the 
Australian Federation (CAF). CAF stipulated similar objectives: revitalizing Australian 
federalism and reacting to federal encroachment. What these examples have in common is 
that they suggest a general tendency of subnational governments to consider horizontal 
coordination as a means to contain the federal government.  
The aim of this research note is to present concepts and data that help to understand 
how intergovernmental councils (IGC) minimize what Jenna Bednar (2009) calls federal 
encroachment. Therefore, I suggest looking at intergovernmental councils as a federal 
safeguard (Bednar 2009). Intergovernmental councils such as CoF and CAF, but also the 
Presidents’ Conference (Conferencia de Presidentes, PC) in Spain, the Deliberation Committee 
(DC) in Belgium or the Conference of Australian Governments (COAG) – as examples of 
councils that involve the federal government – provide governments with a formalized arena 
for coordination. IGC are vertical or horizontal meetings between members of government 
                                                      
1 I am grateful to Dietmar Braun, Ewoud Lauwerier, Sean Müller, Andrea Pilotti, the editors of the Swiss 
Political Science Review, and two anonymous reviewers for their feedback and comments on the 
different versions of this research note. 
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that take place on a more or less regular basis. I posit that intergovernmental councils can 
prevent the federal government from encroaching on subnational jurisdictions and that the 
extent to which a given council does so successfully depends on its design.  
Intergovernmental councils operate in areas in which governments are 
interdependent. Given the benefits of hierarchical coordination (Scharpf 1997), the federal 
government faces incentives to enact unilateral solutions that encroach on subnational 
jurisdiction when policy problems emerge in these areas, which limits the discretion of 
subnational governments to design policies in accordance with local needs and preferences. 
Intergovernmental councils provide an arena for non-hierarchical coordination (Hueglin 
2013), which can prevent the federal government from unilaterally restricting subnational 
discretion.  
Adopting a micro-perspective on individual councils that compares councils both 
across and within federations, the primary aim of this research note is to present an original 
database on the operation of intergovernmental councils. Moreover, the research note seeks 
to show that the concept of federal safeguards can be applied to intergovernmental councils. 
Rather than testing hypotheses, I seek to indicate how the database can be used to apply the 
concept of federal safeguards empirically. Therefore, I explore a way to measure the effect of 
the intergovernmental safeguard. More importantly, I develop concepts that can be used to 
explain whether a given council is a strong safeguard.  
The effect of the intergovernmental safeguard in preventing federal encroachment is 
measured by the extent to which federal encroachment is present or absent. I contend that 
two concepts are relevant to explain the effect of the intergovernmental safeguard: 
‘commitment to coordination’ and ‘dominance of the federal government’. It is different 
configurations of commitment to coordination and dominance of the federal government that 
determine the absence or presence of federal encroachment, and the concepts relate to 
structural incentives and not actual behavior of governments. If governments of both levels 
are committed to coordination, they design intergovernmental councils in a way that 
incentivizes participation in the development, adoption, and implementation of joint 
solutions. The reason is that commitment leads to the council adopting a problem-solving 
mode in which various interests and preferences are accommodated (Bolleyer 2009: 20). This 
increases the costs of exit. In the case of vertical councils, however, another concept comes 
to play: federal dominance, i.e. when the federal government chairs and organizes vertical 
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councils, weakens the intergovernmental safeguard and it undermines commitment to 
coordination because it makes coordination dependent on a federal government’s willingness 
to coordinate. Thus, one should distinguish between horizontal and vertical councils when 
looking at intergovernmental councils as federal safeguards. In the case of horizontal councils, 
commitment explains the effect of a given council in eliminating federal encroachment. If 
commitment is high, horizontal councils are strong safeguards. In the case of vertical councils, 
however, dominance of the federal government is the main explanation and commitment 
matters only if the federal does not dominate the council. 
To measure the level of commitment and the presence and absence of federal 
dominance, I am drawing on an original database that has been constructed within a larger 
research project on 235 intergovernmental councils in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States.2 To construct the database, data was 
collected from council websites, statutes and terms of reference, council reports, information 
provided by council staff, and secondary literature. To measure commitment to coordination, 
I have constructed a composite indicator. 
The research note is structured as follows: I first elaborate the concept of federal 
encroachment as an instance of disruptive unilateralism in areas of interdependence and 
explain how it is measured (section 2) before introducing the intergovernmental safeguard as 
an institutional mechanism to prevent federal encroachment (section 3). I then develop the 
two concepts ‘commitment to coordination’ (section 4) and ‘federal dominance’ (section 5). 
The presentation of each concept is followed by a brief case study comparing two councils for 
illustration. A final section concludes. 
 
2. FEDERAL ENCROACHMENT AS DISRUPTIVE UNILATERALISM 
Scholars such as Bednar (2009) and de Figueiredo and Weingast (2005) have pointed 
to a fundamental problem of federal states: the federal government faces incentives to 
centralize power in his hands to prevent free riding and shirking by the constituent units.3 This 
leads to federal encroachment into subnational jurisdictions that limit the discretion of 
                                                      
2 The outcome of this research project is my Ph.D. dissertation on intergovernmental councils as 
federal safeguards. 
3 Note that both scholars have also pointed to another fundamental problem of federalism in which 
disruptive behavior of subnational governments can lead to the disintegration of the federation. 
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subnational governments to act (see also Braun et al. 2017). While minor instances of federal 
encroachment do not make a federal system unstable, they can turn into system-threatening 
disturbances of the federal balance of power and undermine the federal character of a 
political system if they intensify and multiply (Bednar 2009; Benz and Broschek 2013; Landau 
1973; Braun 2011).  
In situations of interdependence (see Bolleyer and Thorlakson 2012), for example 
when powers overlap or when there is public pressure to harmonize, the federal government 
faces incentives to restore to hierarchical coordination and encroach (Scharpf 1997; Lazar 
2006). In this research note, I define the following situations as federal encroachment being 
present: the federal government enacts a national solution, i.e. a policy solution valid across 
the federation, on its own (no joint solution); governments adopt a joint solution but the 
solution is imposed by the federal government on the other governments instead of being 
developed in a collaborative way4 (imposed solution); governments develop and adopt a joint 
solution but the federal government fails to comply with it (non-compliance). An example for 
non-compliance is the Social Union Framework Agreement in Canada, in which the federal 
government agreed to consult the provinces on the use of the federal spending power but did 
not deliver on this promise in the aftermath (Lazar 2003; Warriner and Peach 2007; Fortin 
2009). Regarding the imposition of a joint solution and non-compliance, note that variations 
are possible in the extent to which the joint solution is imposed and the extent to the federal 
government fails to comply with it.  
  
3. THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SAFEGUARD 
Bednar (2009) contends that federal safeguards prevent the federal government from 
encroaching on subnational jurisdictions. Federal safeguards are institutions that provide 
incentives to the federal government not to encroach. There are different types of federal 
safeguards, defined by the harshness of their reaction and the costs this reaction imposes on 
the federal union. Retaliation and secession are the stronger safeguards but the costlier ones 
compared to milder safeguards such as structural safeguards (enumeration of powers of the 
federal government, horizontal fragmentation and incorporation of state interests); the 
                                                      
4 This often implies take-it-or-leave-it offers by financially superior governments to governments that 
depend on the financial assistance of the earlier. 
  5 
judicial safeguard (the constitutional court); the popular safeguard (the electorate); and the 
political safeguard (the party system). To this list, I am adding intergovernmental councils as 
the intergovernmental safeguard. Because they provide governments with incentives to 
coordinate as equal partners in areas of interdependence, intergovernmental councils prevent 
federal encroachment in areas of interdependence. To do so, they develop, adopt, and 
implement joint solutions in a way that accommodates interests and preferences of all 
governments. 
Intergovernmental councils are more or less regular face-to-face meetings of members 
of the executive branch of government. At minimum, intergovernmental councils consist of a 
plenary assembly of politicians (heads of government or cabinet ministers) chaired by one or 
several members of the council. For a council to be included here, face-to-face meetings of 
cabinet ministers or heads of government5 need to have taken place on a more or less regular 
basis for several years in the past.6 In addition to that, councils can set up a secretariat as well 
as working groups and committees in order for bureaucrats to prepare the meetings of the 
plenary assembly. While these meetings of bureaucrats are often called councils by name as 
well, they are committees of the intergovernmental council rather than separate councils 
since the plenary assembly sets them up to support its work. Different types of 
intergovernmental councils exist (Bolleyer 2009). Vertical councils differ from horizontal 
councils because the federal government is a full member of the earlier but not the latter. 
Generalist councils deal with a variety of policy areas as well as cross-sectoral matters while 
policy-specific councils focus on specific policy areas. National (or nation-wide) councils 
consist of at least 90% of the members of a federation (Parker 2015) in contrast to regional 
councils that are limited to a subgroup of subnational governments. The database introduced 
in this research note includes all these different types of councils with one exception. Bilateral 
councils (a type of regional councils) have been excluded except for the Bilateral Commissions 
(comisiones bilaterales de cooperación) in Spain. All other councils consisting of a subgroup of 
                                                      
5 In the United States, this refers to meetings of governors or (elected) heads of state departments 
such as attorney generals, secretaries of state, or tax commissioners. 
6 In Australia, frequent restructuring of the council system takes place. While these reforms do not 
affect the way councils operate, councils are merged or separated. Because most information is 
available on the system as it existed in 2009 (COAG 2009), the councils existing at this moment of 
time have been included in the database. Another exception are the Federal-Provincial-Territorial 
Council on Social Policy Renewal and the Provincial-Territorial Council on Social Policy Renewal in 
Canada. Both councils ceased to exist in the early 2000s. They have been included in the database 
because they had been established without an expiration date. 
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several subnational governments such as the Western Premiers’ Conferences in Canada or 
Switzerland’s various regional councils have been included.7 To identify councils, I have 
screened council websites, repositories of councils,8 references in secondary literature, and 
media reports.  
The following two concepts related to the design of intergovernmental councils are 
useful to understand why a given council is a strong or weak federal safeguard: the extent to 
which governments are committed to coordination (‘commitment to coordination’) and the 
extent to which the federal government dominates vertical councils (‘dominance of the 
federal government’).  
It is different configurations of commitment and federal dominance that matter, 
depending on the type of council. In the case of horizontal councils, dominance of the federal 
government is absent by default and commitment alone matters. In the case of vertical 
councils, the only configuration in which federal encroachment is minimized is when 
commitment is high and dominance of the federal government is absent (see Table 1). In all 
other configurations, the federal government either imposes a joint solution or fails to comply 
with a joint solution in the implementation phase. If dominance of the federal government is 
absent but commitment is low, there is a chance that councils fail to develop a joint solution 
or to ensure compliance.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
4. COMMITMENT TO COORDINATION 
Commitment to coordination captures the disposition of councils to adopt a problem-
solving mode when developing, adopting, and implementing joint solutions. Commitment 
matters most when governments decide to establish an intergovernmental council. If they are 
committed to coordination, they establish a strong institution and accept the constraints on 
their behavior this implies. If we follow the argument of path dependence (Mahoney 2000), 
the establishment of an intergovernmental council is a critical juncture that, since it 
                                                      
7 Regarding the United States, the various regional groupings that exist within the Council of State 
Governments (CSG), for example, have not been included as separate councils but as committees of 
the CSG. 
8 Such as the overview of intergovernmental meetings provided by the Canadian Intergovernmental 
Conferences Secretariat (CICS). 
  7 
determines the future operation of the council, triggers self-reinforcing sequences that 
increase the costs of exit from coordination. In this sense, commitment to coordination has 
long-term implications. As a consequence, intergovernmental councils are able to develop 
joint solutions that go beyond individual and momentary interests of members, and that are 
accepted by all members (Bolleyer 2009). In addition to that, intergovernmental councils 
develop a long-term perspective in which coordination is not only an ad hoc-enterprise 
(Bolleyer 2009). Moreover, governments comply with these joint solutions because they are 
at least politically binding if not also legally binding. The higher the commitment to 
coordination is, the more likely an intergovernmental council is to develop a problem-solving 
orientation that goes beyond mutual adjustment and bargaining, that common interests 
emerge and that coordination becomes a compulsory exercise (Braun 2006; Scharpf 1988). If 
governments are committed to coordination, they establish intergovernmental councils that 
are highly institutionalized and that produce binding outcomes.9 To measure commitment to 
coordination, I have constructed a composite indicator that aggregates the two indicators 
institutionalization and bindingness. The indicator measures commitment between 0% (low) 
and 100% (high). 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Institutionalization and bindingness capture different aspects of the design of 
intergovernmental councils, and different dynamics of intergovernmental coordination: the 
process leading to joint solutions (institutionalization) and the content and type of joint 
solutions (bindingness). The following sections will elaborate on these points. The two 
dimensions are used to operationalize commitment to coordination and measure whether 
commitment is high or low. Institutionalization and bindingness are not independent from 
each other and we can expect interaction effects.10 Consequently, institutionalization and 
bindingness are different dimensions of commitment to coordination, and they need to be 
weighted equally. 
The higher the level of institutionalization “the more likely it is that intergovernmental 
transactions no longer exclusively express the momentary interest convergence of a group of 
                                                      
9 See online appendix for the coding scheme and the aggregation method.  
10 In fact, the two variables are correlated (r = 0.204, p = 0.001; significant at the 0.01 level) and they 
measure thus the same concept.  
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individual actors” (Bolleyer 2009: 25) and that actors develop common interests. Scharpf 
(1997) has argued that interaction modes differ in their institutional requirements and that 
problem-solving tends to have higher institutional demands than mutual adjustment 
(negative coordination) or bargaining. 
Bolleyer (2009; 2006b) has measured the level of institutionalization of 
intergovernmental councils in Canada, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. The 
indicators she chose are: regularity of meetings, existence of a secretariat, definition of 
functions and formal basis, decision-making, internal functional differentiation, and the status 
and precision of agreements. To measure the level of institutionalization as a dimension of 
commitment to coordination, I have excluded decision-making and the status and precision 
of agreements. The latter is included in the measure of bindingness. Decision-making has been 
excluded because the difference between consensus decision-making, unanimity, and 
majority vote is not clear when it comes to intergovernmental councils because there are 
several instances in which councils applied majority vote but only those members of the 
council having cast a positive vote must adhere to the decision. In addition to that, consensus 
mechanisms or unanimity decisions can have a stronger effect on the behavior of 
governments so that the effect of decision-making is less clear than Bolleyer suggests. 
Consequently, we find a high level of institutionalization if meetings take place several times 
a year, if the council has set up a permanent secretariat, if several (permanent) committees 
and working groups exist, and when a statute or similar document defines the functioning and 
organization of the council. The level of institutionalization is low when meetings take place 
ad hoc, when no secretariat exist, when the council has not set up committees and working 
groups, and when the functioning and organization rely on convention instead of a formal 
document.11  
Outputs of intergovernmental councils are rarely legally binding (Poirier and Saunders 
2015). Nevertheless, they can produce a certain degree of bindingness in the sense that the 
design of the joint solution determines the incentives to comply with it. The argument here is 
not a legal one. Rather, the intuition is that if governments design highly precise solutions and 
invest considerable amounts of money and autonomy, the costs of exit increase in the 
implementation phase. Bindingness is captured by the ‘level of coordination’ (Peters 2004; 
Braun 2008) and the ‘type of outcomes’. Drawing on Peters (2004), I distinguish four levels of 
                                                      
11 See online appendix for information on how each variable was coded. 
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coordination: negative coordination, positive coordination, integration of policy priorities, and 
integration of implementation strategies. Whereas negative coordination requires little 
investment of resources, positive coordination requires that governments give up some 
autonomy or pool some resources. Joint provision of public services or the establishment of 
joint agencies is an example of positive coordination. Bindingness increases when 
governments use councils for policy integration. I distinguish two types of policy integration 
with different levels of bindingness. Joint policy priorities and objectives constitute the first 
type. They commit governments to harmonizing their legislation, which implies an even higher 
investment in terms of autonomy they make governments accountable to each other. This 
effect intensifies when governments agree not only on general objectives but also on 
principles and strategies of implementation that define how the objectives are to be met, the 
second type of policy integration, which often requires some kind of monitoring. This limits 
divergent interpretations because mechanisms and objectives are clearly defined. Regarding 
the second variable, ‘types of outputs’, I distinguish four types: reports and recommendations; 
joint declarations; joint action plans and programs; and intergovernmental agreements. 
Reports and recommendations are mere declarations of intent and governments maintain the 
autonomy to deviate from them. Joint action plans and joint programs require that 
governments pool resources and invest autonomy because they become accountable to each 
other. This is also the case when joint bodies are established, which are less affected by the 
electoral cycle (Poirier and Saunders 2015). Intergovernmental agreements, finally, are 
binding in some federations but not in all federations and not in all areas (Poirier 2001). Where 
intergovernmental agreements are binding, incentives to comply with the joint solution are 
highest. But in any case, intergovernmental agreements formalize the political will of 
governments to work together.12 The investment of autonomy is thus higher compared to 
                                                      
12 The distinction between intergovernmental agreements that are legally binding and those that are 
not is not mirrored in the database for practical reasons. In Switzerland, for example, horizontal 
agreements can be declared binding by the federal government upon request of a certain number of 
cantons in nine predefined areas (Art. 48a Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation). Thus, 
agreements are not binding by default and the legal status is independent from the council in charge. 
Similarly, the legal status of agreements can depend on other contingent factors that are not related 
to a council in the other federations in the database. Moreover, what matters here is that both types 
of agreements indicate higher bindingness than the other three types of outcomes because of their 
(quasi-)formal character. The distinction should and will be addressed in any in-depth analysis of the 
safeguarding effect of a given council, however. 
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informal solutions such as reports, declarations, and joint action plans.13 Poirier (2001: 17) has 
emphasized that even intergovernmental agreements that are not legally enforceable can 
have a similar effect on the behavior of governments as legally enforceable solutions since 
they “are frequently negotiated with a high degree of formality, as if they were contracts”. 
This quasi-formal character of intergovernmental agreements implies that governments face 
much higher incentives to comply with the joint solution. 
 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the aggregate level of commitment to 
coordination in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the 
United States. The scores represent the mean level of commitment indicated by the total 
number of intergovernmental councils. Commitment to coordination is high in Australia, 
Belgium, Spain, and Switzerland (when excluding the regional policy-specific councils) since 
they score above the 57%-threshold, while governments are less committed in Austria, 
Canada, Germany, and the United States.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Joint Solutions in Education Policy in Canada and Switzerland 
To illustrate how ‘commitment to coordination’, affects the extent to which 
intergovernmental councils minimize federal encroachment, this section compares two policy 
solutions in the same policy area in two decentralized federations and regarding subdomains 
where interdependence is pronounced: the funding of teaching of the second national 
language in Canada and the harmonization of basic education in Switzerland. In both cases, 
horizontal councils are in charge of this policy area so that federal dominance is absent. The 
Council of Ministers of Education, Canada (CMEC) and the Conference of Cantonal Directors 
of Education (Erziehungsdirektorenkonferenz, EDK) differ, however, in the level of 
                                                      
13 For both variables the codes reflect the highest level of coordination and the type of outcomes with 
the highest level of formalization to capture the general capacity of the council to produce binding 
outcomes. This means that if a council has produced both reports and intergovernmental 
agreements, the code for intergovernmental agreements has been assigned to this council. 
Provisions included in the formal basis of councils have been the basis for the identification of the 
level of coordination and the type of outcomes. However, if the council website, media reports or 
secondary literature suggest that a council has produced solutions with a higher degree of 
bindingness than the statute suggests, a higher code has been assigned. 
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commitment to coordination they indicate. While governments are committed to 
coordination in education policy in Switzerland (87%), Canadian provinces are not (18%).  
The Intercantonal Agreement on Harmonisation of Compulsory Education 
(Interkantonale Vereinbarung über die Harmonisierung der obligatorischen Schule, HarmoS) 
adopted in 2007 is the joint solution adopted in Switzerland to harmonize basic education. 
The cantons had not only been able to make the federal government refrain from a 
modification of the education article of the Federal Constitution providing the federal 
government with more powers to intervene in education (Fischer, Sciarini, and Traber 2010). 
By enacting the HarmoS agreement, the cantons have then succeeded in preventing the 
federal government from using the subsidiarity clause of the constitutional article on 
education to intervene in basic education. HarmoS has been a genuine project of EDK, 
elaborated in several steps involving different bodies of EDK such as the secretariat, working 
group, and the plenary assembly. The outcome, an intergovernmental agreement, sets a 
general framework stipulating principles and objectives but leaves the cantons with enough 
discretion to adapt the implementation of the obligations of the agreement to local conditions 
(EDK 2015: 5–6) so that cantons are able to comply. Even though not legally binding, the 
political bindingness of HarmoS has been quite strong (EDK 2011) and even cantons that have 
not ratified the agreement for party political reasons have adapted their system accordingly 
(EDK 2015). EDK monitors the implementation of the agreement. The high level of 
institutionalization (89%) of EDK explains the comprehensiveness of the process in which the 
council developed a problem-solving orientation, and the strong bindingness of HarmoS is in 
accordance with the general tendency of the council to produce very binding outcomes 
(100%). 
CMEC, in contrast, has not been able to prevent federal encroachment. In Canada, the 
federal government provides funds to the provinces for the teaching of the second national 
language. The amount of funding and the conditions attached have been largely decided 
unilaterally by the federal government. Every four to five years, the federal government 
announces its funding intentions and both levels of government sign a multilateral Protocol 
for Agreements for Minority-Language Education and Second-Language Instruction through 
CMEC as well as bilateral agreements regarding specific priorities. Given that CMEC merely 
produces communiqués and reports, it has little leverage on the federal government. CMEC 
issued several communiqués in which the provinces called for higher federal funding but the 
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federal government refused to listen. Thus, the weak collective voice of the provinces enabled 
the federal government to impose conditional funding and hereby encroach in a provincial 
jurisdiction. More importantly, the low level of commitment has prevented CMEC from 
developing a problem-solving mode in which provinces would develop joint action plans that 
define the use of federal funding. It has also prevented the council from harmonizing official 
language teaching in a way that federal involvement is not needed.  
Though mere illustrations, these two examples show that commitment determines, for 
example, whether a council develops a problem-solving mode that enables it to solve a given 
policy problem itself so that federal intervention loses its justification. 
 
5. DOMINANCE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF VERTICAL COUNCILS 
To examine the safeguarding effect of a horizontal council, it is sufficient to look at its 
commitment score. In the case of vertical councils, a second variable comes into play: federal 
dominance of vertical councils means that the federal government (permanently) chairs 
meetings and/or provides the secretariat. Consequently, it calls meetings and sets the agenda. 
The argument behind federal dominance is a structural one that captures the federal 
government’s de jure possibility to dominate vertical councils even though there are 
numerous examples where it turned this de jure power into de facto domination (see also 
Trench 2006).14 Federal dominance gives the federal government major leverage over “joint” 
solutions so that they are less collaborative in character. Federal dominance enables the 
federal government to submit joint solutions as take-it-or-leave it offers to the council for 
adoption and it introduces a shadow of hierarchy in intergovernmental coordination. If the 
federal government chairs meetings it can decide which items will be included in the agenda, 
and it can refuse items suggested by subnational governments. Moreover, as the chair of a 
council, the federal government can decide not to call meetings if it wants to go unilateral.15 
If the federal government provides the secretariat, it also has important power over the 
agenda and on the development of institutional interests of the council. This undermines the 
                                                      
14 For Canada see for example Inwood et al. (2011). 
15 This has been the case, to give an example, when the Canadian government decided to unilaterally 
adjust transfers to the provinces in 2014 and refused to negotiate a new Health Accord when the old 
one expired (“Medicare Defenders Set to Protest as Health Accord Expires” The Globe and Mail, 
20.03.2014). 
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level of institutionalization of the vertical council and gives the federal government significant 
leverage over the bindingness of outcomes.  
 
The federal government in fact dominates most vertical councils in the database 
(77.8%). This pattern holds true if one looks at the federations individually (Figure 1Error! 
Reference source not found.). Except for Germany and Switzerland, the federal government 
dominates most vertical councils. What is more, it chairs several peak councils such as the 
Conference of Australian Governments (COAG) and Belgium’s Deliberation Committee and 
provides their secretariat.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Joint Solutions in Education and Fiscal Policy in Australia 
To empirically illustrate the use of this concept when examining the safeguarding 
effect of vertical councils, this section compares policy solutions adopted in Australia in 
domains of fiscal and education policy in which interdependence is pronounced. To emphasize 
the effect of federal dominance, commitment is held constant (it is high in both instances). 
While in education policy, federal dominance is absent, the councils in charge of fiscal policy, 
the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) and the Ministerial Council on Federal Financial 
Relations, are dominated by the federal government. 
The joint solution enacted in education policy is the Australian Curriculum (AC). The AC 
was enacted in a rather collaborative way by the education council and the Australian 
Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA), a body established by the 
education council. The education council developed the guidelines for curriculum 
development and ACARA elaborated the AC. Hence, the AC was neither enacted as a national 
solution by the federal government on its own, nor was it imposed by the federal 
government.16 Smaller issues of compliance emerged in the aftermath,17 but they constitute 
minor instances of federal encroachment and can be neglected for the sake of the argument 
                                                      
16 This is not to neglect that the federal government used its spending power to lure the states into 
agreeing to develop a national curriculum in the context of the “Education Revolution” (Harris-Hart 
2010). 
17 “Compulsory Dispute Splits Curriculum Reform Team” The Australian, 16.09.2014.  
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here. In fact, the states were in favor of and even engaged in coordination of school 
curriculums (CAF 2007) and they participated in the elaboration of the AC. The actual work on 
the AC started when the federal government announced its “Education Revolution” (Reid 
2009) and both levels of government signed the National Education Agreement in 2009. In 
fact, the federal government had to involve the states – via the education council – in the 
elaboration of the Australian Curriculum to implement its Education Revolution. 
 The federal government could entirely impose the Intergovernmental Agreement on 
Federal Financial Relations (IGA-FFR), a reform of the federal transfer system, upon the states. 
What is more, once the agreement was adopted, the federal government continued to impose 
conditional grants on the state and hence violated the agreement (McQuestin and Woods 
2010; Fenna and Anderson 2012). Thus, the IGA-FRR is an example of federal imposition of 
and non-compliance with a policy solution. The states had called for a reform of funding 
arrangements (Carroll and Head 2010; CAF 2006) but the federal government initiated the 
reform only at a moment of time when it wanted to (Fenna and Anderson 2012). Since it calls 
the meetings and sets the agenda, it decided to call COAG meetings to present its intention to 
the states for the purpose of delivering on its election promises (Carroll and Head 2010). The 
Ministerial Council on Federal Financial Relations developed general parameters of a new 
agreement on funding arrangements. Its working groups were chaired by federal ministers, 
however. Moreover, the content of the agreement itself was to a considerable extent driven 
by priorities set by the federal government in its annual budget (Fenna and Anderson 2012). 
This means that the federal government practically submitted the agreement as a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to the states for adoption. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In recent years, subnational governments have invested in horizontal 
intergovernmental councils to counterbalance the federal government and prevent it from 
encroaching on subnational jurisdictions. In this research note, I have suggested that 
intergovernmental councils are federal safeguards based on this observation.  
The intergovernmental safeguard operates in areas of interdependence, where federal 
encroachment has disruptive effects on the federal peace. The character of policy solutions 
developed in areas of interdependence can be used as an indicator to measure the 
safeguarding effect of intergovernmental councils. Councils are strong safeguards if the 
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federal government refrains from imposing a policy solution on the subnational governments 
and if it complies with commonly agreed policy solutions. To examine the safeguarding effect 
and look for explanations, I have introduced two concepts: ‘commitment to coordination’ and 
‘dominance of the federal government’ of vertical councils. When governments are 
committed to coordination they design councils in a way that the council adopts a problem-
solving mode in which various interests and preferences are accommodated so that the 
benefits of coordination and the costs of exit increase, which reduces the incentives for the 
federal government to encroach. Thus, the effect of horizontal councils in tackling federal 
encroachment depends on the extent to which governments are committed to coordination. 
Compared to their Canadian equivalent, horizontal councils in Switzerland have indeed been 
more successful in solving problems in education policy in a collaborative way because Swiss 
governments are highly committed to coordination in this area – in contrast to their Canadian 
counterparts. Consequently, the horizontal council solved the problem in a way that federal 
intervention was not needed. In Canada, however, a low level of commitment prevented the 
provinces from speaking with one strong voice to counter federal encroachment.  
In the case of vertical councils, commitment comes into play only if the federal 
government does not dominate the council. When the federal government chairs meetings, 
sets the agenda or provides the secretariat, it can impose a solution on the subnational 
government and it faces fewer incentives to comply with the solution in the implementation 
phase even if governments are committed to coordination. In Australia, federal dominance is 
absent in the education council, and even though the federal government had some leverage 
over the development of a national curriculum it had to involve the states, via the education 
council and ACARA, and could not impose a solution on them. Federal encroachment was very 
pronounced in the reform of the transfer system on the states (the adoption of the IGA-FFR). 
The reason is that its dominance of both COAG and the Council on Federal Financial Relations 
enabled it to decide to develop the IGA-FFR on its own and to submit it to the council as a 
take-or-leave-it offer. Moreover, it refused to comply with the agreement in the 
implementation phase.  
Federal dominance is absent by default in horizontal councils, which suggests that they 
are the stronger safeguards. In fact, subnational governments even use horizontal councils to 
counterbalance the federal government as reports and communiqués issued by horizontal 
councils such as the Council of the Federation in Canada (CoF), the Conference of Prime 
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Ministers (Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz, MPK) in Germany or the Council of the Australian 
Federation (CAF) as well as policy-specific councils indicate (see also Watts 2006). They use 
these arenas in order to find common positions on issues they seek to address to the federal 
government. Recently for example, Swiss cantons via the Conference of Cantonal 
Governments (KdK) and the Conference of Cantonal Finance Directors jointly pressured the 
federal government to compensate them for losses emanating from a federal reform of 
corporate taxes (Unternehmenssteuerreform III)18. Subnational governments consider that 
speaking with one voice when claiming adequate funding or calling upon the federal 
government not to intervene into subnational jurisdiction provides them with a stronger 
position to counterbalance federal power. While such horizontal institutions have existed in 
Austria, Germany, and the United States for several decades, subnational governments in 
Australia, Canada, Spain, and Switzerland have invested in horizontal coordination since the 
1990s to counter centralization. Statues of the Council of the Australian Federation (2006),19 
the Council of the Federation (Canada, 2003),20 the Conference of Governments of the 
Autonomous Communities (Spain, 2010), and the Conference of Cantonal Executives 
(Switzerland, 1993) explicitly stipulate the objective of forging a common front towards the 
federal government. Referring to the Canadian example, Bolleyer summarizes constituent 
units’ motivations behind horizontal coordination, finding that Canadian provinces turned ad 
hoc Annual Premiers Conferences (APC) into the Council of the Federation  
"especially because the federal government regularly tried to play one province off 
against another and had considerable success in doing so. Correspondingly, the individual 
autonomy losses arising from the stronger organizational backup of the council were 
acceptable despite the existing intraprovincial competitive pressure — because the CoF 
strengthened collective provincial autonomy protection" (Bolleyer 2006a: 485).  
What is more, because the federal government dominates most vertical councils, the 
Canadian federation has developed a system in which most vertical councils have a purely 
                                                      
18 "Kantone Wollen Leichteres Paket" Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 13.12.2014, p. 13. 
19 Before Australian states established the Council of the Australian Federation (CAF), a so-called 
Leaders’ Forum existed. However, this council was much more informal and weakly organized. 
Consequently, the establishment of CAF is an important turning point. 
20 Strictly speaking and similar to CAF, the Council of the federation is not a new council. Before CoF 
was established in 2003, Annual Premiers Conferences (APC) were organized for the purpose of 
coordination among heads of government of Canadian provinces and territories. After experiencing 
federal unilateralism for over a decade, provinces and territories decided to invest in a more 
institutionalized version of APC in order to contain federal opportunism. Thus, the establishment of 
CoF in 2003 marks an important turning point. 
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horizontal counterpart that provinces use to prepare vertical meetings. Since the 1990s, 
provinces have become increasingly aware that they need to find consensus among 
themselves first before negotiating with the federal government. Frequently, they have 
criticized federal dominance of vertical councils, claiming that the federal government refused 
to put salient matters on the agenda that were of particular interest to the provinces (Inwood 
et al. 2011; Lazar 2003: 6).  
The aim of this research paper was to present an original database on the operation of 
intergovernmental councils and to illustrate how this database can be used to examine the 
function of intergovernmental councils within a federal system. In contrast to Bolleyer’s study 
on the level of institutionalization and integration of IGC, I have suggested to use concepts 
related to the operation of councils when looking at the safeguarding effect of 
intergovernmental councils. I have thus applied the concept of federal safeguards to 
intergovernmental councils. Because the scope of this research note was limited to the 
presentation of the database and the definition and operationalization of intergovernmental 
councils as federal safeguards, further research is needed. An item on the research agenda 
should be the development of testable hypotheses that take into account the specific context 
in which individual councils operate such as different types and degrees of interdependence. 
Moreover, HarmoS, the funding of official language teaching in Canada, the AC, and the IGA-
FFR are instances in which a policy solution has been jointly enacted so that the strongest type 
of federal encroachment, namely the decision of the federal government to enact its own 
policy solution in areas of subnational jurisdiction because governments fail to succeed in 
jointly adopting a policy solution has not been discussed in this research note. While a lack of 
commitment to coordination certainly accounts for such instances, there are situations in 
which the federal government can enact its own solution even though governments are 
committed to coordination. This is the case when a policy problem is federally salient. This 
means that councils exclude matters from their agenda because of their contentiousness. 
Further research on the effect of the intergovernmental councils should look at these 
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Tables 
 




0 0 no joint solution or lack of compliance 
1 0 joint solution 
0 1 no joint solution or imposed solution 
1 1 imposed solution and/or lack of compliance of 
the federal government 
 
Table 2: Dimensions and variables used to operationalize commitment to intergovernmental coordination 
C O M M I T M E N T  
INSTITUTIONALIZATION BINDINGNESS 
- Regularity of meetings 
- Secretariat 
- Number of Committees 
- Definition of Functions 
- Level of Coordination  
- Types of Outcomes 
 
 
Table 3: Mean commitment to coordination in eight federations (percentages indicate the mean score of all 








AUSTRALIA 41 64.52% .20893 .044 
AUSTRIA 13 30.51% .19057 .036 
BELGIUM 1022 70.07% .26271 .069 
CANADA 28 46.56% .24807 .062 
GERMANY 25 48.61% .21689 .047 












UNITED STATES 22 49.91% .18817 .035 
                                                      
21 Indicates the number of councils where sufficient information could be found to determine the level 
of commitment only.  
22 More councils exist in Belgium than indicated here. Yet, these councils have been excluded since 
sufficient information on their functioning could not be found. 
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Source: own data  
 
 
Figure 1: Federal dominance of vertical councils in each federation. 
 
Bars indicate the number of vertical councils. Source: own data 
 
 
